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TEMPORARY VICTIMS: INTERPRETING THE
FEDERAL FRAUD AND THEFT SENTENCING
GUIDELINE
I. INTRODUCTION
In most cases, it is easy to identify the victim of a crime. The battery
victim with a broken nose, the larceny victim who lost his wallet, and the
arson victim whose home has burned to the ground are all readily identifiable.
In rare instances, however, it is unclear whether an individual who has
suffered from the criminal conduct of another is truly a ―victim,‖ at least for
purposes of federal sentencing. The determination can alter a prison sentence
by years.
Take the case of individual ―victims‖ of bank fraud. In most of these
cases, banks reimburse account holders for fraudulent charges. Thus, while a
fraudulent ATM charge may cost an individual $300 for a brief time, her
lender will quickly make her financially whole. Narrowly interpreting the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), some courts have concluded that
such reimbursed individuals are not ―victims‖ when determining a convicted
defendant‘s appropriate sentencing range. 1
Rather, only the lending
institution that ultimately suffers the financial loss is included as a victim. 2
This determination can alternatively double or halve a defendant‘s sentence. 3
And yet, though the individuals in these cases are ―made whole,‖ they are
still likely to feel victimized. Beyond just a lingering sense of victimization
and a lack of trust in the security of their possessions, these individuals suffer
loss because they frequently spend time and effort as a result of the crime.
For example, such victims may need to contact their banks several times to
secure reimbursement. Some victims must endure a long battle with credit
reporting agencies to restore their credit histories and reputations. In cases
where a ―victim‖ goes to such lengths, excluding him from the victim total
would distort the severity of the crime and improperly exclude the value of
the time spent by the individual.
Further, Congress approved the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to
establish a system of uniform and proportionate sentencing. 4 A circuit split
emerged as some courts included reimbursed individuals as victims and other
courts denied such treatment. Consequently, similar defendants committing
1.
2.
3.
4.

See infra Part III.A.
See id.
See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A.
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similar crimes received different sentences. Because such variances are at
odds with the fundamental goals of the Guidelines, the Federal Sentencing
Commission amended the ―number-of-victims‖ provision to ensure consistent
treatment of reimbursed parties. Yet the recent amendment is flawed as well.
Part II of this Comment examines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
focusing on their history and objectives, their application, and the fraud and
theft guideline. Part III analyzes the cases interpreting the number-of-victims
provision of the Guidelines and the circuit split that has developed. Part IV
addresses the recent amendment and explains why both the plain text and the
purposes of the Guidelines support a reasonably broad interpretation of
―victims.‖ Finally, Part V concludes with a few thoughts on why the Federal
Sentencing Commission and federal courts should interpret ―victim‖ in a way
that comports with its everyday meaning.
II. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have a profound impact on the
sentencing of guilty defendants in federal courts.5 Through the Guidelines,
Congress attempts to control crime through fair and effective sentencing that
emphasizes honesty, uniformity, and proportionality. 6 The Guidelines include
an entry governing the sentencing of every federal crime. Guideline section
2B1.1 covers fraud crimes. The fraud crimes guideline includes a potential
sentence enhancement based on the number of victims of the crime. 7 As the
number of victims rises, the sentencing range increases.8 Thus, federal courts
must determine an accurate and consistent interpretation of ―victim‖ to ensure
uniform and proportionate sentencing.
A. History and Purpose
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were created and are overseen today
by the Federal Sentencing Commission (Commission), a permanent
administrative agency created by Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.9 Congress charged the Commission with a thorough review of federal
sentencing procedures and vested the Commission with broad authority to
develop sentencing rules that would further two basic goals of criminal
5. Until the Supreme Court‘s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the
Guidelines almost entirely controlled federal sentencing. Still, all sentencing decisions must begin
with the determination of the appropriate Guidelines range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49
(2007).
6. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2009).
7. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2).
8. Id.
9. The Sentencing Reform Act was enacted as Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2034 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551–3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2006)).
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punishment: deterrence and retribution. 10 The fundamental goal of the
Sentencing Reform Act was ―to enhance the ability of the criminal justice
system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system.‖11 To
achieve this goal, Congress directed the Commission to create guidelines that
fulfilled three qualities: honesty, uniformity, and proportionality. 12
The Commission easily achieved the goal of honesty; in the Guidelines,
the Commission has abolished parole and severely limited sentencing
reductions for good behavior.13 Prior to the implementation of the Guidelines,
―truth-in-sentencing‖ was rare.14 Federal sentencing was an indeterminate
system where judges had broad discretion to choose prison sentences from
large statutory windows.15 Once a prisoner went to prison, however, parole
boards largely controlled the length of sentences through their broad power to
grant or deny parole. 16 As a result, convicted criminals in the federal system
often spent just one-third of their prescribed sentences in prison. 17 Under the
Guidelines, however, sentence reductions for good behavior are limited to
fifty-four days per year, a maximum of less than 15%.18 Thus, barring
exceptional circumstances, federal prisoners will serve at least 85% of their
proscribed sentence before being released.
In addition to honesty, Congress sought a system of sentencing that
achieved some degree of uniformity. 19 Because of the great discretion
afforded to parole boards and judges prior to the implementation of the
Guidelines, federal sentences often varied dramatically for offenders whose
offenses and criminal history were largely similar.20 To combat this perceived
injustice, Congress tried to create a system that would limit the flexibility of
judges to vary their sentences and eliminate parole.21 Congress mandated that
10. Id. at 2018. Notably, Congress explicitly rejected rehabilitation as a goal of federal
criminal sentencing. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 4:6, at 134 n.7 (3d ed.
2004).
11. USSG § 1A1.3. Academics and judges alike question whether the Guidelines have
succeeded in this endeavor. See, e.g., Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s
Perspective, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 11, 17–18 (2003) (blaming the Guidelines‘ failure on the lack of
discretion afforded judges).
12. USSG § 1A1.3.
13. Id. § 1A1.2.
14. Id. § 1A1.3.
15. See id.; see also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 223–30
(1993).
16. USSG § 1A1.3.
17. Id.; see Stith & Koh, supra note 15, at 227–28.
18. USSG § 1A1.3.
19. Id.
20. See CAMPBELL, supra note 10, § 4:6, at 134.
21. USSG § 1A1.2.

848

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:845

the Commission create small ranges for judges to use that would be based on
the severity of the crime committed and an individual‘s criminal history.22
Finally, Congress sought proportional sentencing. 23 Proportionality
means that criminals committing more serious crimes receive longer
sentences; criminals committing less serious crimes are punished less
severely. Again, because of varying degrees of leniency granted by parole
boards and judges, sentences fluctuated considerably. 24
The natural
consequence of these fluctuations was that some criminals who committed
more serious crimes received shorter sentences than others who committed
less serious crimes. 25 The Commission pored over research to create a rough
hierarchy of crimes to determine their severity. 26 The Commission also listed
various aggravating and mitigating factors within the Guidelines to
differentiate between more and less serious degrees of criminal conduct
within the same general offense. 27
The Supreme Court has addressed a number of challenges to the
Guidelines in the last twenty years. Soon after the implementation of the
Guidelines, the Court upheld their constitutionality against claims that they
violated nondelegation and separation of powers principles. 28 In 2005,
however, the Court ruled that mandatory application of the Guidelines is
unconstitutional. 29 Consequently, today federal judges may impose nonGuidelines sentences.30 Despite the Booker Court‘s relegation of the
Guidelines to an advisory position, they are still important: The first step in
determining any federal sentence, even if deviating from the Guidelines, is to

22. USSG § 1A1.3. Congress mandated that the upper-end of each sentencing range generally
could not exceed the lower-end by the greater of six months or 25%. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2006).
23. USSG § 1A1.3.
24. See CAMPBELL, supra note 10, § 4:6, at 134.
25. The Commission saw this effect frequently in cases of economic crime, such as fraud and
embezzlement. Criminals committing such crimes generally received shorter sentences than similar
criminals who exhibited ―other apparently equivalent behavior.‖ USSG § 1A1.3.
26. Id.
27. See infra Part II.B. for details on the application of aggravating and mitigating factors.
28. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72, 412 (1989). The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Guidelines in spite of a number of collateral attacks as well. See Susan R.
Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ’s Attack on Federal Judicial “Leniency,” the Supreme
Court’s Response, and the Future of Criminal Sentencing, 44 TULSA L. REV. 519, 536 (2009) (―In
every case directly challenging their constitutionality [prior to 2000], . . . the Court upheld the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines from attack.‖).
29. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In a badly fractured decision that included
six separate opinions, and in which eight justices dissented on at least one point, the Court held, inter
alia, that mandatory application of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee
in that it required judges to sentence defendants based on findings of fact that were neither admitted
by the defendant nor accepted by the jury as true beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 249–53.
30. See id.
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determine the appropriate Guidelines sentence. 31
B. How Courts Apply the Guidelines
A complex multi-step process is used to determine the recommended
sentencing range under the Guidelines. 32 First, the court must determine the
offense level, measuring the severity of the crime, according to the rules
promulgated by the Federal Sentencing Commission. 33 Every offense has a
base level that can be increased or decreased based on enhancing and
mitigating factors.34 Next, the court must determine the criminal history of
the defendant based on the quantity and severity of previous convictions. 35
These two factors combine to provide the basic sentencing range for a
particular crime and defendant.36 Judges may deviate upward or downward
from that range if they conclude that further mitigating or enhancing factors
exist that are not included or sufficiently emphasized in the initial
calculation.37
Every federal crime has a base level that the Federal Sentencing
Commission determines based on the seriousness of the offense, ranging from
one to forty-three. 38 The court determines the base level applicable to the
crime and then evaluates the Guideline section to determine whether any
specific offense characteristics apply. 39 After going through the specific
section to determine whether to apply any specific offense characteristics, the
court turns to the remainder of the Guidelines to determine whether any largescale adjustments apply.40 The result of these additions and subtractions is the
defendant‘s offense level.
The court then turns to the criminal history of the defendant, which is

31. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
32. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2009). The use of this technical process
has come under severe criticism. See Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1342–43 (2005) (―[T]he complexity of
the sentencing table and accompanying rules is an important cause of many common complaints
about federal sentencing.‖). See generally KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998).
33. USSG § 1B1.1(a).
34. Id. § 1B1.1(b)–(e).
35. Id. § 1B1.1(f).
36. Id. § 1B1.1(g).
37. Id. § 1B1.1(h)–(i).
38. Id. §§ 1B1.1(a), 1B1.2(a), 2A.
39. Id. § 1B1.1(b). An example of an offense characteristic specific to the fraud guideline is
the total loss incurred or intended in the fraud. A loss of $5,000 to $9,999 causes a two-level
increase, while a $400 million loss causes a thirty-level increase. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
40. Id. § 1B1.1(c). For example, the offense level for all crimes is lowered for individuals who
had a minimal role in the commission of a crime or who cooperated with authorities. Conversely,
leaders and organizers face an increased offense level. Id. § 3B.
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determined on a six-point scale. 41 To determine an individual‘s score on this
scale, the court must calculate the number of ―criminal history points‖ a
defendant has accumulated.42 Defendants receive three points for each prior
conviction that had a prison sentence of more than thirteen months, two points
for each sentence of sixty days to thirteen months, and one point for any other
convictions. 43 The resulting total is transferred onto the six-point scale:
defendants with zero or one criminal history points score a I, while those with
thirteen or more score a VI.44
Finally, the court combines the offense level with the criminal history
score to determine an individual‘s recommended Guidelines sentence. 45 Once
the court has this information, it may deviate from the sentence based on
factors not adequately considered by the Guidelines or it may choose to issue
a non-Guidelines sentence. 46
It is difficult to see how the Guidelines function without using a real
example. The fraud section provides a good illustration. As a hypothetical,
imagine a bank fraud scheme where the defendant stole $2,000,000 before
being arrested. The base level for most federal fraud crimes is six. 47 Assume
that the only specific offense characteristic applicable to the crime is for the
$2,000,000 loss. Losses of more than $1,000,000 but less than $2,500,000
add sixteen levels to the offense level. 48 Further, assume that no other
enhancing or mitigating factors are applicable to this defendant. Thus, the
defendant‘s offense level is twenty-two.49 If this defendant is a first-time
criminal with a criminal history score of I, his recommended sentence is
41–51 months (3.42–4.25 years).50 If, on the other hand, he is a repeat
offender with a criminal history score of VI, his recommended sentence is

41. Id. §§ 1B1.1(f), 4A1.1.
42. Id. § 4A1.1.
43. Id. There are a number of other technical rules beyond the scope of this Note including, for
example, adjustments for probation violations, career criminal conduct, and foreign criminal
convictions.
44. Id. § 5A.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 1B1.1(i); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
47. USSG § 2B1.1(a)(2). The base level is seven in cases where the defendant is convicted of a
fraud or a theft crime meriting the statutory maximum penalty of twenty years or more. Id.
§ 2B1.1(a)(1).
48. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I).
49. Six for the base offense level plus sixteen for the adjustment based on the $2,000,000 loss.
Note that in cases such as this, the amount of loss has a much larger role in determining the ultimate
sentencing range than the base level of this crime. This is in accord with the proportionality goal of
the Guidelines. A fraud scheme that nets a few thousand dollars is much less serious than one that
causes a multimillion-dollar loss. Sentences naturally reflect this disparity.
50. Id. § 5A.
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84–105 months (7.00–8.75 years).51
C. The Fraud and Theft Guideline52
As noted above, the base offense level for most fraud and theft crimes
under the Guidelines is six.53 The only exception is for crimes that have a
statutory maximum penalty of twenty years or more, in which case the base
level is seven. 54 In addition to the number-of-victims enhancement, there are
several other specific offense characteristics applicable to this section. For
example, courts add two levels when the defendant commits a theft from the
person of another.55 The section also provides for two-level increases for
misrepresentations that the defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable
organization56 and the use of fraudulent means of identification in a fraud or
theft crime. 57 In total, there are sixteen offense characteristics specific to the
fraud and theft guideline. 58
Among the specific offense characteristics is an enhancement based on the
number of victims of the crime. 59 As the number of victims increases, the
offense level rises as well. The current version of the Guidelines provides for
three levels of increases: a two-level increase for a crime that victimizes at
least ten parties,60 a four-level increase for a crime with fifty or more
victims,61 and a six-level increase for a crime with 250 or more victims. 62
The controversy surrounding the application of this enhancement arises
from the section‘s definition of ―victim,‖ which does not directly address
situations of reimbursement. Under the Guidelines, a ―victim‖ is ―any person
who sustained any part of the actual loss determined under‖ the loss
calculation.63 Thus, when determining who is a victim of a fraud crime,
51. Id.
52. The full title of Guideline Section 2B1.1 is ―Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of
Theft; Offenses Involving Stolen Property; Property Damage or Destruction; Fraud and Deceit;
Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer
Obligations of the United States.‖ It covers a wider range of conduct than just fraud and theft, but as
those are the most commonly charged crimes under this section, commentators generally refer to it
by the shortened title.
53. USSG § 2B1.1(a)(2).
54. Id. § 2B1.1(a)(1).
55. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(3).
56. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(8).
57. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(10).
58. As noted in Part II.B., the largest potential increase comes from the loss enhancement,
which can raise the offense level as much as thirty levels. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P).
59. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2).
60. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i).
61. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B).
62. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C).
63. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. ―Person‖ includes both individuals and business entities. Id.
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courts must look to the loss determination. ―Actual loss‖ is ―the reasonably
foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.‖ 64 Finally,
―pecuniary harm‖ is ―harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily
measurable in money. Accordingly, pecuniary harm does not include
emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other non-economic harm.‖65 Thus,
a victim is any person (1) who sustains harm that is either monetary or readily
measurable in money, (2) whose harm resulted from the criminal offense, and
(3) whose harm is included in the total loss calculation. 66
The definition is inadequate because it is initially unclear whether a
person who suffers a temporary monetary loss should be included in the
victim calculation. Take, for example, a credit cardholder whose lender
guarantees that any fraudulent charges will be reimbursed. Individual victims
in these cases may suffer a temporary monetary loss, but the ultimate
monetary loss is borne by the lending agency. If individuals are included as
victims due to this specific monetary loss, courts run the risk of ―double
counting‖ the actual loss as determined in the loss calculation. 67 Yet, it runs
counter to the goals of the Guidelines to disregard the individual victims when
determining a sentence. 68
The interpretation of this enhancement is more than a mere academic
exercise. It has a significant impact on the potential sentences of those
convicted for federal fraud and theft crimes. Take the same hypothetical used
above (fraud crime where the defendant stole $2,000,000 and had an offense
level of twenty-two). Assume that this criminal fraudulently charged the
$2,000,000 on 300 individual bank accounts. Further, assume that the
ultimate loss was borne by five credit card companies. If a court determines
that only five victims exist for the purpose of the Guidelines, the final offense
level is twenty-two, as there is no number-of-victims increase for crimes
involving fewer than ten victims. If, however, the court determines that all
300 individuals are victims in addition to the lenders, the final level rises to
twenty-eight, due to the six-level increase for crimes of 250 or more victims.

64. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i).
65. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii).
66. See United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008), for a similar, though
slightly differently worded, definition.
67. See United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 782 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying individuals
recognition as victims when the government claimed the same actual loss for the individuals and for
institutional lenders). But see United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding
reimbursed parties suffered the same loss as reimbursing institutions at different times).
68. See United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 494 (5th Cir. 2008) (Garza, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (questioning the proportionality of imposing the same sentences on two
defendants when one defrauded many more individuals); see also USSG § 1A1.3 for a discussion of
uniform and proportionate sentencing.
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A six-level increase roughly doubles the recommended sentencing range. 69
As noted above, the recommended sentence for a defendant with an offense
level of twenty-two and a criminal history of I is forty-one to fifty-one
months.70 At level twenty-eight, the recommended sentence is seventy-eight
to ninety-seven months.71 The difference at the midpoints of the two ranges is
41.5 months (nearly 3.5 years). Thus, if two defendants in different circuits
commit the exact same crime, they could receive substantially different
sentences.72 To ensure uniform sentencing for fraud crimes, it is crucial that
federal courts interpret the number-of-victims enhancement consistently
across the nation.
III. APPELLATE INTERPRETATION
Eight circuits have addressed the number-of-victims enhancement, with
three interpretations emerging from the cases. Four circuits have adopted a
narrow interpretation of ―victim‖ that excludes reimbursed parties. 73 Two
circuits have adopted a broad interpretation that would automatically include
such individuals.74 Finally, two circuits have adopted a middle approach that
would potentially include reimbursed parties as victims, but only if they suffer
a loss in addition to the reimbursed money, and if that loss is measured
separately from the financial loss suffered by the lenders.75
To a degree, the tests adopted by each circuit resulted from the facts of
each case. Courts that adopted a broad definition of ―victim‖ tended to do so
in cases where the reimbursed party spent more time and effort in securing the
reimbursement, while many of the purported victims in the narrow
interpretation line of cases were completely unaware of the crimes committed
against them. To resolve this split, the Federal Sentencing Commission
amended the Guidelines, adding a provision discussed infra in Part IV.
A. The Narrow Interpretation—United States v. Yagar
The first line of cases almost categorically rejected the inclusion of
reimbursed parties as victims for sentencing. Though some of the courts left
open a narrow exception for cases where parties went to extraordinary lengths
69. USSG § 5A.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See infra Part III.
73. See United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 422 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Conner,
537 F.3d 480, 489 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Icaza, 492 F.3d 967, 969 (8th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005).
74. See United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Lee, 427
F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005).
75. See United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v.
Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 782 (9th Cir. 2008).
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to secure reimbursement, the case law makes clear that those cases are out of
the ordinary. United States v. Yagar 76 largely exemplifies the arguments
made in this line of cases.
The Yagar court was the first federal appellate court to address the issue
of the status of reimbursed parties as victims. 77 In Yagar, the defendant
engaged in a mail theft and bank fraud scheme where she used stolen checks
to deposit money into several victims‘ bank accounts. 78 After depositing the
money, she withdrew a share of it using the victims‘ stolen account
information. 79 All told, Yagar stole more than $20,000 out of forty-seven
bank accounts belonging to more than sixty individuals. 80 Of those sixty, at
least six spent money to purchase new checks following the theft, and it was
unclear from the record whether the individuals‘ banks ever reimbursed them
for the cost of the checks. 81 With the possible exception of those check
purchases, five banks completely reimbursed all individual losses. 82
Yagar pleaded guilty to mail theft83 in exchange for the dismissal of an
additional identity theft 84 charge. 85 The presentence investigation report did
not recommend an enhancement based on the number of victims, but the
government filed a position paper recommending a four-level enhancement on
the grounds that Yagar‘s crime involved more than fifty victims. 86 The
district court rejected the government‘s request for a four-level enhancement
but granted a two-level enhancement based on its determination that there
were eleven victims of this crime. 87 The court concluded that the six account
holders who spent money buying new checks were victims along with the five
banks who bore the ultimate loss.88
On appeal, the government argued that even a temporary loss qualifies an
individual as a victim under the fraud and theft guideline because the
Guidelines provide no indication as to when the actual loss must occur.89 By
76. 404 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2005).
77. Id. Yagar has been cited persuasively by other circuits that have adopted this narrow
interpretation. See Kennedy, 554 F.3d at 420; Conner, 537 F.3d at 489.
78. 404 F.3d at 968.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 968, 970.
81. Id. at 971–72.
82. Id. at 971.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (2000).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2000).
85. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 968.
86. Id. at 968.
87. Id. at 968–69.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 971. The government has repeatedly adopted this reasoning in cases with reimbursed
parties. See, e.g., United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 490 (5th Cir. 2008). The Conner court held
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this reasoning, each individual account holder would be a victim from the
moment Yagar depleted the individual‘s account, regardless of whether the
individual purchased new checks or was later reimbursed. Yagar appealed
and argued that the banks were the only victims of the crime because they
suffered the ultimate loss and the evidence as to the check purchases was
insufficient to increase her sentence. 90
The Sixth Circuit rejected the government‘s argument and agreed with
Yagar‘s argument, concluding that neither the account holders as a group nor
the individuals who purchased checks were victims. 91 The court ruled that the
individuals who purchased new checks were not victims because the evidence
in the record was insufficient to support a conclusion that the banks never
reimbursed the individuals.92 More substantively, the court concluded that the
sixty account holders were not victims. 93 The court reasoned that because the
banks immediately reimbursed the individual losses, the individuals suffered
no practical adverse effect from the crime. 94 Without such an adverse effect,
the individuals were not victims.95
The court, however, left open the possibility that individuals suffering
temporary losses under other circumstances could be victims, enigmatically
noting, ―[T]here may be situations in which a person could be considered a
‗victim‘ under the Guidelines even though he or she is ultimately
reimbursed.‖96 The court did not specify the circumstances in which a court
that it would take ―a strained reading‖ of the Guidelines to conclude that individuals become victims
at the moment of a loss, and remain so even after being reimbursed. Id. This, however, is exactly
what the broad interpretation courts have concluded. See United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56
(1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005).
90. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 969.
91. Id. at 971–72.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 971.
94. Id.; cf. United States v. Icaza, 492 F.3d 967, 969 (8th Cir. 2007). In Icaza, defendants stole
merchandise from hundreds of Walgreens stores. Id. at 968–69. The government argued that each
Walgreens franchisee (and, in the alternative, that each shareholder) was a victim, but the court
concluded that only the corporate parent, who reimbursed the individual stores, was a victim. Id. at
970. The court relied heavily on testimony from a Walgreens corporate executive, who testified that
―ultimately the corporation takes the loss.‖ Id. at 969.
95. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971.
96. Id. Other courts in this line have likewise claimed that under different facts, a reimbursed
party could be a victim. See United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 491 (5th Cir. 2008) (―The
evidence here indicated that the account holders were quickly reimbursed for the improper charges
on their accounts. If they had paid those charges and encountered difficulty in obtaining
reimbursement, a different question would be presented.‖). One court went so far as to dismiss the
existence of a circuit split, and instead concluded that courts adopting the broad interpretation merely
―fell within the Yagar carve-out for those who could be considered victims, despite ultimately being
reimbursed, because they suffered some additional harm.‖ United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415,
421 (3d Cir. 2009). Because the tests adopted by the other lines are logically distinct from the tests
adopted by the narrow line, this Comment concludes that the broad interpretations are not merely
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should consider a reimbursed party in the victim calculations. Presumably,
the government would need to show that the individuals suffered some
adverse effect as a result of the crime, but it is unclear what kind of temporary
losses would suffice in this and other ―narrow‖ circuits.
At least one court in this line of cases has rejected the use of logic in
concluding that reimbursed parties are victims. In United States v. Conner,97
the trial court reasoned that as a matter of ―‗garden-variety logic,‘‖ some of
the businesses defrauded in a fraud scheme must have lost business time in
trying to obtain reimbursement after the fraudulent charges, but the court
admitted that it had no evidence for this conclusion. 98 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit explicitly noted that the businesses were quickly reimbursed and did
not encounter any difficulties or debts as a result of the crime. 99 Addressing
the trial court‘s garden-variety logic, the court held that courts must base any
sentencing enhancements on a preponderance of the evidence. 100 The court
left open the possibility of including business losses as part of the victim
calculation but held that ―the district court‘s speculation as to the existence of
these facts was an insufficient basis to enhance Conner‘s sentence.‖ 101
Courts in this line of cases have generally concluded that a plain reading
of the text of the fraud guideline reveals that reimbursed parties cannot be
victims.102 Generally, they have offered little analysis for this proposition. 103
This lack of analysis is problematic, especially because other courts have
concluded that reimbursed parties may be victims. Indeed, in the circuits that
have adopted a broad definition of ―victim,‖ reimbursed parties are
necessarily victims.
B. The Broad Interpretation—United States v. Stepanian
Two circuits have completely rejected the methodology offered by the
preceding line of cases and instead have held that any party who loses
money—even temporarily—is a victim from the time of the initial loss. In

exceptions to the narrow rule, but rather demonstrate the existence of a circuit split.
97. 537 F.3d at 491.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 491–92.
101. Id. at 491. Unlike the other cases in this line, Conner provoked a dissent that advocated
for a broader interpretation of ―victim.‖ Id. at 493 (Garza, J., dissenting). Judge Garza examined the
purposes of the Guidelines, and concluded that the reasoning of the majority (as well as the Yagar
and Icaza courts) ―runs counter to the fundamental sentencing goal of tying the severity of a
defendant‘s sentence to the seriousness of the defendant‘s crime.‖ Id. at 494.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding, with no
analysis, that it was ―undisputed‖ that the account holders did not sustain any part of the loss by
virtue of the reimbursement).
103. Id.
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these circuits, reimbursement is irrelevant in determining whether a party is a
victim for sentencing purposes. United States v. Stepanian104 best exemplifies
this line of cases.
In Stepanian, the defendant was part of a team that stole credit and debit
card information by replacing debit card terminals at grocery stores.105 Video
surveillance eventually revealed the operation, and a store employee contacted
police when he recognized one of the defendant‘s coconspirators from the
video.106 The defendant was arrested while sitting in a getaway car outside
the front of the store.107 It is unclear from the court‘s opinion precisely how
many individuals‘ information the conspirators possessed; however, the
number surely exceeded 250 because the court applied the six-level
enhancement. The unauthorized charges on these accounts prior to arrest
totaled more than $130,000.108
The defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit access device
fraud109 and aggravated identity theft,110 and was sentenced to seventy-two
months in prison. 111 The defendant‘s offense level for sentencing included a
six-level enhancement for a crime with 250 or more victims. 112 The trial court
concluded that the parties whose accounts were fraudulently charged were
victims based on the initial act of having money taken from their account,
regardless of future reimbursement:
―[T]here has been loss experienced by all the victims in the
case. The loss experienced by the individual victims may
have been for a short period of time, might have been for a
week or two weeks or for a day, whatever the case may be.
There was reimbursement, no doubt, that occurred, but I don‘t
think the guidelines speak in terms of the length of time that a
victim is deprived of their money or access to their money
any more than in any other crime of fraud or that involves
stealing, that the question of whether the person is a victim is
determined by whether they‘re deprived of their resources for
an hour, a day, a month or a year . . . . It seems to me these
104. 570 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2009).
105. Id. at 53. The terminals they swapped in place of the original terminals collected users‘
account numbers and PIN codes. Id.
106. Id. The video also revealed how easy the switches were. One of the defendants distracted
a night clerk with conversation while two others switched out the terminals. Id. Amazingly, the
switches took only twelve seconds. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) (2006).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006).
111. Stepanian, 570 F.3d at 52.
112. Id. at 54.
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people were victims because money was stolen from their
accounts.‖113
Because the individuals were deprived of their property, regardless of how
long the deprivation lasted, the court considered them victims.
On appeal, the First Circuit agreed with the trial court‘s analysis and
concluded that the reimbursed parties were victims under the fraud and theft
guideline‘s definition. 114 In doing so, the court accepted an argument rejected
by those courts that adopted the narrow definition of ―victim.‖ Specifically,
the court held that the parties were victims at the moment of the withdrawal,
and later reimbursement did not delete them from the victim roll. 115 Noting
that a victim must sustain a part of the ―actual loss,‖ the Stepanian court
concluded that actual loss included a temporal dimension. 116 Thus, the
reimbursed parties sustained actual loss during the period before the
reimbursement, while the lenders sustained actual loss following the
reimbursement.
The court explicitly broke with the narrow line of cases in taking this
position.117 It rejected the Yagar court‘s assertion that the reimbursed
individuals did not ―suffer any ‗adverse effect as a practical matter.‘‖ 118 To
show that the reimbursed individuals did in fact suffer from the crime, the
court noted the ―‗declaration of victim losses‘‖ statements used by the trial
court:
The declarations reveal that one victim who was traveling
abroad could not pay her travel expenses during the period of
the theft. Another victim described how he and his family
had no money for food and gas for a period of time because
of the theft, and how their card was denied when they tried to
use it to pay for their son‘s birthday party. That victim
concluded ―it put a big financial burden on my family for a
few weeks.‖ Although every victim of the scheme may not
have a similarly dramatic story, these declarations provide
tangible support for our conclusion that even where losses are
reimbursed, unauthorized withdrawals from bank accounts
113. Id. (quoting the trial court at sentencing).
114. Id. at 55.
115. Id. At least two circuits explicitly rejected this argument when the government made it,
concluding that the guideline does not ―‗stop the clock‘‖ and create victims at the moment of the
offense. United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 490 (5th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Yagar,
404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005).
116. Stepanian, 570 F.3d at 55.
117. Id. at 56 (―In drawing this conclusion, we reject the position of some other circuits that the
account holders did not suffer actual pecuniary harm, ‗readily measurable in money,‘ because their
losses were reimbursed.‖).
118. Id. (citing Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971).
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cause real economic harm. 119
The court further noted, however, that the government need not show this
actual harm in order for the court to apply the number-of-victims
enhancement.120
The court‘s textual analysis also led it to adopt the broad interpretation. 121
Included in the loss calculation provision of the fraud and theft guideline is a
―Credits Against Loss‖ provision. 122 The provision provides that loss should
be reduced by any amount returned by the defendant ―to the victim.‖123 The
First Circuit found this language persuasive in showing that the provision
presupposes that an individual is a victim at the time of loss and remains so
even if he is entirely reimbursed.124
The Eleventh Circuit also found this language persuasive when adopting
the broad interpretation:
When considering the impact of recovered collateral, or the
return of money, property, or services, to the victim, the
Guidelines treat those so recovering as having suffered a loss
but then allow the defendant to take credit against the total
loss for the value of the recovered or returned loss. Stated
another way, inherent in the credit against loss provision is an
acknowledgment that there was in fact an initial loss, even
though it was subsequently remedied by recovery of collateral

119. Stepanian, 570 F.3d at 56.
120. Id. at 56 n.7 (―[T]he government [need not] prove the kind of harm described in the letters
to establish the applicability of the multiple victim enhancement. We simply offer these accounts in
support of our position that such withdrawals, whatever the particulars of the impact in an individual
case, do represent real economic harm.‖) (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 56–57.
122. The provision reads as follows:
Loss shall be reduced by the following:
(i) The money returned, and the fair market value of the property
returned and the services rendered, by the defendant or other persons acting
jointly with the defendant, to the victim before the offense was detected.
The time of detection of the offense is the earlier of (I) the time the offense
was discovered by a victim or government agency; or (II) the time the
defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the offense was
detected or about to be detected by a victim or government agency.
(ii) In a case involving collateral pledged or otherwise provided by the
defendant, the amount the victim has recovered at the time of sentencing
from disposition of the collateral, or if the collateral has not been disposed
of by that time, the fair market value of the collateral at the time of
sentencing.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E) (2009).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Stepanian, 570 F.3d at 56.
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or return of goods.125
United States v. Lee is factually distinguishable from most cases that have
addressed the reimbursed victims issue in that many of the victims had to
spend considerable time and effort before mitigating their damages. 126 The
victim-merchants resorted to repossession and foreclosure to reclaim their
property, and in some cases it took them more than a year to secure the
necessary legal judgments. 127 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit later
extended the broad definition—albeit in an unpublished case—to a factual
scenario more similar to the other cases where courts have addressed the
issue.128
Under the broad interpretation, courts need not prove actual harm separate
from the initial loss in order to include individuals as victims. Instead, the
fact that the loss occurred at all is sufficient to justify their inclusion. The
lack of necessity to prove a more permanent loss is what separates the ―broad‖
line of cases from the middle ground discussed below. 129 In the following
cases, the government must prove that the reimbursed party actually suffered
a loss and quantify that loss in addition to the reimbursed money.
C. United States v. Abiodun—A Middle Ground?
Rejecting both the categorical exclusion and the automatic inclusion of
reimbursed individuals as victims, the following cases take a practical
approach to the problem. The two circuits deciding cases in this line assessed
whether the purported victims practically suffered an adverse effect that could
be measured in economic terms. United States v. Abiodun130 is the leading
case in this line.
In Abiodun, a defendant engaged in an identity theft scheme where he
used credit reports belonging to other people to access the equity on their
credit cards.131 After receiving a credit report, the defendant would contact
the individual‘s bank or lender to report a change of address and, several days

125. United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id. Though the defendants were generally loathe to repay any of the defrauded businesses,
a threat from a hair replacement therapy business to stop treatments generated quick repayment. Id.
at 886.
128. See United States v. Cornelius, 202 F. Appx. 437, 439 (11th Cir. 2006) (―In Lee, we . . .
distinguished Yagar on the grounds that the losses suffered by the victims were not short-term or
subject to indemnity. However, . . . the Guidelines allow a court to find an actual loss by a
reimbursed party, and therefore treat that party as a victim.‖).
129. See infra Part III.C.
130. (Abiodun II), 536 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008).
131. Id. at 164–65.
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later, a damaged card.132 The companies would thus send new cards to the
defendant‘s address. He then withdrew money and purchased merchandise
using the new cards.133 As in the previous cases, banks and credit card
companies reimbursed the cardholders for their losses.134 Police apprehended
the defendant after he participated in this scheme for more than five years.135
The defendant pleaded guilty to identification document fraud, 136 credit
access device fraud,137 and conspiracy to commit wire fraud,138 and the trial
court sentenced him to ninety-six months in prison.139 Included in the
sentencing determination was a six-level Guidelines enhancement based on
the number of victims, as the trial court concluded that it was ―‗more likely
than not‘‖ that the defendant‘s fraud involved more than 250 victims. 140 The
victim total included dozens of corporate victims, a small number of
individuals who lost money, and a large number of individuals who ―spent an
appreciable amount of time securing reimbursement for their financial
losses.‖141 Though the trial court counted as victims those individuals who
suffered monetary loss due to the value of their lost time, it did not include the
value of this time in its loss calculation. 142
On appeal, the defendant argued that under United States v. Yagar,143
individuals who are fully reimbursed for their losses cannot be considered
victims for the purposes of the Guidelines enhancement. 144 The government,
on the other hand, relied on United States v. Lee145 in arguing that even
reimbursed parties are victims. 146 The court fashioned a test that largely split
the difference between the two lines. 147 According to the Second Circuit:

132. United States v. Abiodun (Abiodun I), 442 F. Supp. 2d 88, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
133. Id. The crime was lucrative; the defendant ―wore Armani and Versace suits, Movado
watches, and Cartier glasses, and drove a Lexus.‖ Id. at 94.
134. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 166.
135. Id. at 164.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2000).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (2000).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
139. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 163.
140. Id. at 166 (quoting the trial court at sentencing).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 169.
143. 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005).
144. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 168.
145. 427 F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005).
146. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 168. The government made this argument in United States v.
Armstead as well, arguing that the reimbursed individuals were victims at the moment of the loss and
remained so. 552 F.3d 769, 781 (9th Cir. 2008). As in all cases but those within the ―broad
interpretation‖ line, the court rejected the argument. Id. at 781–82.
147. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 168–69.
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[I]ndividuals who are ultimately reimbursed by their banks or
credit card companies can be considered ―victims‖ of a theft
or fraud offense for purposes of [the number-of-victims
Guidelines enhancement] if—as a practical matter—they
suffered (1) an adverse effect (2) as a result of the defendant‘s
conduct that (3) can be measured in monetary terms. 148
Thus, the court held that the individual victims in this case who were
reimbursed by their banks and credit card companies were victims as long as
the trial court could determine that they spent ―an appreciable amount of
time‖ ensuring reimbursement and that the value of the time spent could be
measured monetarily. 149 Because the trial court failed to include the value of
this lost time, the Second Circuit remanded the case with instructions for the
district court to: ―(1) recalculate the loss amount associated with each of the
defendants‘ crimes to include the time lost by these potential victims or (2)
determine whether, if these individuals are excluded from the count, it is still
‗more likely than not‘ that Abiodun‘s crimes affected ‗250-plus victims.‘‖150
Though the Abiodun court concluded that it was simply applying the
reasoning of Yagar, the court clearly went beyond Yagar‘s holding. In Yagar,
the court found that the individuals suffered no adverse effect and, hence,
were not victims. 151 The court further speculated, in vague dicta, that there
―may be situations‖ where reimbursed individuals could be victims, but it
provided no examples as to what situations might qualify. 152 The Second
Circuit in Abiodun, however, held that any time there is an adverse effect

148. Id. The court in Armstead took a similar approach:
A loss that is reimbursed immediately does not amount to a pecuniary harm
because the ultimate loss cannot be measured in monetary terms. If, however,
the reimbursement takes a longer period of time [and requires a great deal of
effort on the part of the individual], it is conceivable that the individual may
[suffer additional pecuniary harm that is not fully reimbursed]. If that loss is
included in the loss calculation, the victim associated with the loss should be
included in the victim calculation.
Armstead, 552 F.3d at 782 (citations omitted).
149. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 169. The trial court in this case did not measure the value of this
lost time or include this value in the total loss calculation. In failing to do so, the court violated the
Guidelines rule that ―victims‖ include only those who have sustained an actual loss. Thus, the court
remanded the case to the trial court to measure the value of this lost time and include it in the total
loss calculation. Id.
150. Id. (citation omitted). Likewise, the Armstead court remanded with instructions for the
district court to quantify the loss of the reimbursed parties and include it in the loss calculation.
Armstead, 552 F.3d at 783. For example, if the cost of obtaining a new driver‘s license was not
included in the reimbursement, the court could simply multiply the number of defrauded individuals
by the cost of a Washington driver‘s license, and add the total to the loss calculation. See id.
151. United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005).
152. Id.
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measurable in monetary terms, a reimbursed individual can be considered a
victim. 153 In adopting such a broad, bright-line test, the court created a more
lenient standard than did the Yagar court.
IV. THE ABIODUN APPROACH IS SUPERIOR
Since these cases were decided, the Federal Sentencing Commission
amended the commentary to section 2B1.1 to include an additional victim
definition specific solely to crimes involving the use of ―means of
identification.‖ Under the amendment, an individual is a victim if he meets
the definition in the remainder of the section or if his ―means of identification
was used unlawfully or without authority.‖154 Without changing the overall
definition of ―victim,‖ the commission nevertheless adopted the broad
approach taken by the Stepanian court.
There are advantages to such an amendment. First, it eliminates the
circuit split and ensures that courts are likely to treat these crimes in a similar
fashion. Further, an interpretation that automatically includes reimbursed
parties is superior to one that automatically excludes them. The former
interpretation recognizes that it is possible for reimbursed parties to suffer a
loss, while the latter completely precludes such a possibility. Indeed, the
Commission recognized the flaw in the narrow definition of ―victim‖: that
reimbursed individuals ―must often spend significant time resolving credit
problems and related issues, and such lost time may not be adequately
accounted for in the loss calculations.‖155 Further, the amendment is efficient;
rather than requiring courts to determine the value of lost time, it lets them
simply add individuals to the victim total.
This amendment nevertheless sacrifices accuracy at the altar of efficiency.
By automatically including reimbursed parties as victims, there is no way to
distinguish between a crime where parties spent hundreds of hours seeking
reimbursement from a crime where the parties were completely unaware of a
loss. Establishing such a broad rule penalizes criminals in cases where
―victims‖ were unaware that they were victimized and marginalizes true
victims whose lives are upended by a fraud crime. 156
The better route would have been to codify the Abiodun interpretation,
interpreting ―victim‖ to include any individuals who spent any amount of time
making themselves whole as a result of the defendant‘s crime, but not those
who are unaware of the loss before reimbursement or spend no time or money
153. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 168–69.
154. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(E) (2009).
155. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,750, 21,751 (May 8,
2009) (amending the commentary to USSG § 2B1.1).
156. Of course, courts may deviate from Guidelines-recommended sentences, but, in practice,
deviations are the exception rather than the norm.
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securing reimbursement. 157 First, the plain text of the Guidelines prior to the
amendment supported such a reading. Whether an individual is a victim
under this section turned on whether that person suffered a loss that is ―readily
measurable in money.‖158 Because an individual‘s time is readily measurable
in money, courts should include it in the loss calculation. Further, the
commentary specifically excludes a series of items from the loss
calculation,159 but did not exclude the monetary value of time spent by
victims. Second, the purposes of the Guidelines support the Abiodun
approach. Including time-based losses more accurately ties a defendant‘s
punishment to the severity of her crime, which promotes proportionate
sentencing. Thus, the Commission should have adopted an amendment that
recognized reimbursed individuals, as victims only if they spent time securing
such reimbursement.
A. A Plain Reading of the Guidelines Supports the Abiodun Approach
Whether to include an individual as a victim turns on whether the
individual suffered a part of the actual loss determined in the loss
calculation.160 That decision depends on whether the loss is a reasonably
foreseeable pecuniary harm.161 No one seriously disputes that an individual
cancelling a credit card, requesting a fraud alert, or contacting a bank is a
―reasonably foreseeable‖ consequence of a fraud crime. 162 Thus, the inquiry
turns on whether the time invested in such actions is pecuniary harm. Again,
pecuniary harm is ―harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily
measurable in money.‖163
The value of lost time is ―readily measurable in money‖ using the
―opportunity cost‖ of the lost time. 164 Black’s Law Dictionary defines
opportunity cost as ―[t]he cost of acquiring an asset measured by the value of
an alternative investment that is forgone.‖ 165 Economists, however, use
157. One exception to this rule would be for individuals who spent time only in cooperating
with prosecutors or police as part of the government‘s investigation. The Guidelines specifically
exclude ―costs incurred by victims primarily to aid the government in[] the prosecution and criminal
investigation of an offense.‖ USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(D)(ii) (2009).
158. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii).
159. E.g., id. (excluding emotional distress and harm to reputation from the loss calculation).
160. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1.
161. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i).
162. A consequence of the crime is reasonably foreseeable when the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the consequence was a ―potential result of the offense.‖ Id.
§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iv).
163. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii).
164. Opportunity cost is ―[p]erhaps the most fundamental concept in economics.‖ D AVID W.
PEARCE, THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 315 (David W. Pearce & Robert Shaw
eds., 4th ed. 1992).
165. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 398 (9th ed. 2009).
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opportunity cost more broadly to measure the value of lost time as well:
When economists refer to the ―opportunity cost‖ of a
resource, they mean the value of the next-highest-valued
alternative use of that resource. If, for example, you spend
time . . . going to a movie, you cannot spend that time at
home reading a book . . . . If your next-best alternative to
seeing the movie is reading the book, then the opportunity
cost of seeing the movie is the money spent plus the pleasure
you forgo by not reading the book. 166
Thus, the opportunity cost of an hour spent contacting a bank or credit
reporting agency because of a fraud crime is the value of the hour to the
individual in spending that hour as she would have done but for the crime. 167
Using opportunity cost, economists are readily able to measure the
monetary value of time, even if most judges are not trained to do so. That
judges cannot measure this value with scientific precision is not an
impediment to using opportunity cost to value time. The Guidelines
commentary notes, ―[t]he court need only make a reasonable estimate of the
loss. The sentencing judge is in a unique position to assess the evidence and
estimate the loss based upon that evidence.‖ 168 Consequently, as long as the
court can reasonably estimate the value of the time, it can include it in the loss
calculations.
Because the value of time is readily measurable in money, courts should
include this value in their loss calculations unless another section of the
Guidelines excludes such losses. Though the Guidelines specifically exclude
166. David R. Henderson, Opportunity Cost, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
44, 44 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993). As an additional example, the cost of attending college is
not only tuition, but also the salary the student forgoes by choosing school rather than work. Id. at
44–45.
At least one federal court has used opportunity cost in a similar manner. In determining the
reasonability of an attorney‘s hourly rate in a case awarding attorney‘s fees, the court noted that the
attorney‘s opportunity cost was the amount he forewent by representing the client at issue or, in other
words, ―the rate the attorney could have received from a client whom he charged by the hour for the
same type of work.‖ Morimanno v. Taco Bell, 979 F. Supp. 791, 797 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (emphasis
omitted).
167. One possible concern about this method is that different opportunity costs could undercut
the proportionality goal of the Guidelines by valuing different victims‘ time at different rates, and
thus imposing different sentences for similar crimes. For example, the value of a law firm managing
partner‘s time is likely higher than that of a retiree. There are two responses to such an objection.
First, because ―[t]he court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss,‖ USSG § 2B1.1 cmt.
n.3(C), it could estimate the value of the lost time across all the victims, rather than making a
separate calculation for each victim. Second, as a practical matter, it is highly unlikely that adding
the value of the opportunity cost into the loss calculation will move a defendant into a different loss
category, given the size of most of the categories. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
168. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C). Because the Guidelines call for only a reasonable estimate, a
judge does not need to be a trained economist to perform the necessary opportunity cost calculations.
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several types of losses, they do not discuss lost time or similar items.
One such exclusion is for ―emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other
non-economic harm.‖169 Lost time is qualitatively different from emotional
distress and harm to reputation. Emotional distress and harm to reputation are
ethereal concepts that courts cannot reasonably measure. Whereas courts can
estimate lost time in units (e.g., minutes or hours) and convert these units to
dollar amounts (using opportunity cost), no similar measurements can be
made for these other types of harm.170
The argument that lost time falls into the catchall ―other non-economic
harm‖171 category is similarly unavailing. Based on its usage in the section, it
is clear that ―other non-economic harm‖ simply refers to items that are neither
monetary nor readily measurable in money. The full definition of pecuniary
harm is ―harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily measurable in
money. Accordingly, pecuniary harm does not include emotional distress,
harm to reputation, or other non-economic harm.‖172 The use of the word
―[a]ccordingly‖ indicates a relationship between the first sentence and the
second, whereby the latter sentence is a conclusion based in part on the former
sentence‘s major premise. Thus, the text indicates that the Commission was
simply distinguishing between items that are measurable in money and those
that are not. Because lost time is measurable in money, as discussed above, it
does not fall into the latter category.
The Guidelines commentary also excludes ―[i]nterest of any kind, finance
charges, late fees, penalties, amounts based on an agreed-upon return or rate
of return, or other similar costs‖ from the loss calculation. 173 The defendant in
United States v. Armstead argued that the court could not include any timebased losses due to their similarity to the losses excluded in this section. 174 In
his brief, the defendant argued that ―the costs [the reimbursed individuals]
incurred—getting a new driver‘s license or correcting a credit report—were
exactly the type of routine finance costs and fees that the Application Note
explicitly excludes from the enhancement‘s coverage.‖ 175
The Ninth Circuit did not address this argument because it remanded the
case on other grounds. 176 Had the court addressed it, however, it should have
169. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii).
170. Indeed, it would be impossible for courts to determine how many units of emotional
distress a ―victim‖ suffered.
171. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii).
172. Id.
173. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(D)(i).
174. 552 F.3d 769, 783 n.14 (9th Cir. 2008).
175. Appellant‘s Opening Brief at 46, United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2008)
(No. 06-30550).
176. Armstead, 552 F.3d at 784–85.
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rejected it. Lost time is qualitatively different from finance charges and
interest. Note that the appellant in Armstead subtly changed the language in
the commentary; the appellant argued that the language stands for all ―routine
finance costs.‖177 In reality, the language refers to only a specified type of
financial losses, those related to interest, fees, penalties, and the like. The cost
of obtaining a new driver‘s license, contacting a bank or credit card company,
and retrieving a credit history are simply different from lost interest from a
savings account or late fees on a credit card bill. The language in the
commentary excludes just the latter, not the former.
Had the Commission wanted to exclude the value of lost time from the
calculation, it could have explicitly done so. By failing to do so, and by
expressly creating several exceptions, the canon of construction expressio
unius est exclusio alterius178 should prevent courts from reading additional
exceptions into the text. This canon of construction frowns upon judicial
expansion of lists created by legislatures (or, in this case, quasi-legislative
bodies), especially in situations where courts examine exceptions to a general
rule: ―Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general
prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of
evidence of a contrary legislative intent.‖179 Courts should not read additional
exclusions into the loss provision without an indication that the Commission
intended such exclusions.180 Because no such intent is present, courts should
not exclude the value of lost time from their loss calculations.
Because the value of lost time is readily measurable in money, and
because the Commission provides no reason to exclude it from the loss
calculation, courts should include such losses in their determination. As such,
they should also include the victims whose lost time accounts for these losses
when tallying the number of victims of the fraud.
B. The Abiodun Approach Is Most Consistent with the Purposes of the
Guidelines
Just as the pre-amendment plain text of the fraud and theft guideline made
clear that courts should include the value of lost time when determining
whether reimbursed individuals are victims, congressional intent further

177. Appellant‘s Opening Brief at 46, Armstead, 552 F.3d 769 (No. 06-30550).
178. The expression of one is the exclusion of others. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 661
(9th ed. 2009). This canon has been criticized as illogical. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 806 (1983). Yet, it
retains its most persuasive force when dealing with exceptions to a general rule. See Nat‘l Ass‘n of
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 677–78 (2007) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 188 (1978)).
179. Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980).
180. See id. at 616–19.
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supports this interpretation. Uniform sentencing requires courts across the
nation to consistently apply the Guidelines; thus, circuit splits should be
avoided where possible. Further, proportionate sentencing dictates that
defendants who cause more harm should be punished more severely than
those who cause less harm. 181 All other things being equal, defendants whose
crimes require many individuals to spend time seeking reimbursement cause
more harm than others; therefore, these defendants should receive longer
sentences. Thus, including reimbursed individuals as victims when they
spend time securing reimbursement is faithful to congressional intent, as well
as to the text of the Guidelines.
Uniform sentencing requires that similar defendants who commit similar
crimes receive similar sentences. Congress saw uniform sentencing as a key
element in its plan to ―enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to
combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system.‖ 182 Prior to the use
of the Guidelines, wide disparities in sentencing and time served existed for
―similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.‖183
The
Guidelines combat these disparities by creating objective standards and
categories that judges use to determine a recommended sentencing range. 184
Though courts may deviate from this range, the range provides a consistent
starting point from which courts must work. While this system does not
guarantee perfect uniformity, it is significantly more uniform than the preGuidelines system where a court chose a sentence from a large statutory
window and parole boards determined how much of the sentence was served.
Courts jeopardize even the pretense of uniformity, however, when they
apply the Guidelines in varying fashions. When courts fail to apply rules
consistently, the recommended sentencing range for similar criminal conduct
committed by similarly situated defendants may differ significantly. If
recommended sentencing ranges for similar defendants committing similar
crimes vary significantly, there is little reason for courts to go through the
elaborate process required in applying the Guidelines. Thus, regardless of the
outcome, it is important that courts apply the number-of-victims enhancement
in a consistent fashion.
To ensure uniform sentencing, consistency is imperative. By including as
a victim anyone whose means of identification was used, the recent
amendment ensures uniformity. To ensure uniform and proportionate
181. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991) (―[T]he assessment of harm caused by
the defendant . . . has understandably been an important concern of the criminal law . . . in
determining the appropriate punishment. Thus, two equally blameworthy criminal defendants may
be guilty of different offenses solely because their acts cause differing amounts of harm.‖).
182. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2009).
183. Id.
184. See supra Part II.B.

2009]

TEMPORARY VICTIMS

869

sentencing, however, the better approach would have been for courts to
consistently apply the Abiodun definition of ―victim.‖
In a sense,
proportionality is a corollary of uniformity: If the same criminals committing
the same crimes receive the same sentences, the same criminals committing
more serious crimes should receive longer sentences. The specificity of the
Guidelines attempts to measure incremental differences in the seriousness of
crimes in order to ―impose[] appropriately different sentences for criminal
conduct of differing severity.‖185
The most significant way that courts stratify sentence length under the
fraud and theft guideline is via the enhancement based on amount of loss. 186
A loss of $400 million or more will raise the offense level by thirty levels. 187
As noted above, this makes sense: the most important factor in determining
the severity of a fraud or theft crime is the amount of money stolen. 188
The monetary loss alone, however, may be insufficient to measure the
total gravity of an offense. The following cases are three hypothetical
examples where the monetary loss is the same but the harm inflicted differs.
In Case 1, a defendant secures a $1,000,000 loan from a bank and absconds
with the money. In Case 2, the defendant uses a bank fraud scheme to steal
$10,000 out of 100 different individual accounts at the same bank. Though
the individual account holders are aware of the loss and take steps to secure
reimbursement and protect their credit ratings, the $1,000,000 loss is borne by
the bank. In Case 3, the defendant does the same as the defendant in Case 2,
but the individuals are reimbursed immediately and remain unaware of the
temporary loss.
In terms of monetary loss, the outcomes are the same: In each case, the
bank has lost $1,000,000. Yet, the amount of harm inflicted differs. In the
first and third cases, the harm inflicted seems to end with the $1,000,000 loss.
In the second case, the bank suffers the same loss, but 100 additional
individuals suffer harm as well. Using a highly conservative estimate, assume
the individuals spent an average of one hour each contacting their bank,
repeatedly checking their credit histories and ratings, and requesting new
debit cards or changing passwords. The second fraud thus costs individuals a

185. USSG § 1A1.3.
186. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
187. Id. The recommended sentence for a first-time offender at level 6 is 0–6 months, and the
court has the authority to impose probation in lieu of jail time. Id. § 5A. At level 36, the
recommended sentence is 188–235 months. Id.
188. For an example of the importance of the loss total to the severity of the crime, see the
fraud of Bernard Madoff, the New York financier whose Ponzi scheme may have cost investors
$50 billion. Mr. Madoff received a 150-year sentence for his crimes. See Diana B. Henriques,
Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A1.
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total of 100 productive hours from their lives.189
Under a narrow definition of ―pecuniary loss‖ and ―victim,‖ the crimes in
the first two scenarios would receive the same treatment. 190 Under the broad
definition, adopted by the Commission with the recent amendment, the second
and third cases are treated the same. The Abiodun definition, however, best
differentiates between the different amounts of harm caused in each scenario.
This result accords with the Guidelines‘ goal of proportionate sentencing:
Because the second crime inflicted more harm than the first or the third, the
sentence for the second crime should be longer than the sentence for the
others.191
Thus, in addition to complying with the text of the Guidelines, a broad
interpretation of ―victims‖ serves the goals of uniform and proportionate
sentencing.
C. Applying the Abiodun Interpretation
Again, a hypothetical might best illustrate how a court would apply the
broad interpretation of ―victim‖ expounded above. To continue with the facts
of Case 2, assume the defendant went to trial and was convicted of bank fraud
based on the $1,000,000 he stole from the 100 bank accounts.
Under the Abiodun test, the court could not ―double count‖ losses as
belonging to both individuals and corporate lenders. 192 Unlike the broad line
of cases, the monetary loss will apply only to the bank, as the ultimate bearer
of that loss.193 Unlike the narrow line, however, courts would be able to
include a reimbursed individual any time the government proved that the
individual spent time dealing with the issues arising from the defendant‘s
criminal conduct. Thus, an individual who spends even fifteen minutes on the
phone with her credit card company to alert the company of a fraudulent
charge is a victim. 194
189. In reality, victims of identity theft typically spend much more than one hour trying to
restore their credit and ensure reimbursement. A 2003 federal study estimated that victims spent an
average of two to nine hours resulting from the crime, with 6% of individuals spending more than
240 hours.
FED. TRADE COMM‘N, IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 45 (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf. In addition, 37% of individuals paid money out
of pocket due to the crime. Id. at 43.
190. Without any additional enhancements or mitigating factors, the offense level for both
crimes would be twenty (6—the base offense level—plus 14—a loss of more than $400,000). USSG
§ 2B1.1.
191. See id. § 1A1.3 for a discussion of proportionality in sentencing.
192. See United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 491 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Yagar,
404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005).
193. Further, individuals could not be added on the basis of lost interest, which is excluded
from the loss calculation in USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(D)(i).
194. Again, note that under this interpretation there will be circumstances where reimbursed
individuals do not qualify as victims. In cases where reimbursement truly is instantaneous, as the
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When making a loss determination195 for the defendant in Case 2, the trial
court would add the value of the lost time to the value of the money stolen.
Assume that the court concluded that $25 per hour is a reasonable value of the
average individual‘s time lost in the fraud.196 The value of 100 hours lost then
would be $2,500.197 Thus, the total loss resulting from the crime would be
$1,002,500.198 By including this extra $2,500 in the loss calculation, the court
then would be free to include the individual victims when determining
whether a number-of-victims enhancement applies. Because the court
concluded that roughly 100 individuals suffered losses in addition to the bank,
the court should apply a four-level increase based on a finding of more than
fifty victims. 199
To include the individuals in the sentencing determination, the
government would need to prove that the individuals spent time responding to
and mitigating the fraud. Courts would not be able to rely on ―‗garden-variety
logic‘‖200 in order to apply the enhancement; prosecutors or presentence
investigation reports would need to present evidence of such losses. Despite
its ultimate adoption of the broad interpretation of ―victim,‖ the Stepanian
court provides a good example of how this could be done. Before applying
the broad interpretation, the court noted the stories of victims who suffered
real financial burdens as a result of the crime charged. 201 Instead of simply
listing these individuals as victims, the court should have made an attempt to
quantify their loss based on these stories and then add it to the financial loss
eventually borne by the reimbursing banks. While the Abiodun approach
takes longer and is less efficient than the automatic inclusion provision
adopted in the most recent edition of the Guidelines, it more accurately
reflects the severity of a fraud crime.
V. CONCLUSION
The circuit split discussed above made a mockery of the sentencing

courts in Yagar and Conner discussed, many individuals will lose no time as a result of the fraud.
See Conner, 537 F.3d at 491; Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971. Thus, they would not be victims.
195. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1).
196. The final value placed on the lost time is, of course, less important than the fact that the
court is valuing the time because the purpose of valuing the time is to include the victims in the
victim calculation. It is unlikely that the additional loss resulting from the value of the lost time will
change the sentencing recommendation. See supra note 167.
197. Twenty-five dollars per hour multiplied by 100 hours is $2,500.
198. If the court so desired, it could also calculate the value of the lost time suffered by the
bank as a result of the fraud, although it is unlikely that doing so would make any difference to the
defendant‘s ultimate sentence.
199. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B).
200. United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 491 (5th Cir. 2008).
201. United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2009).
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principles of uniformity and proportionality. Defendants in some cases had
enhancements applied to them that may not have been applied in other
circuits. In the Yagar line of cases, individuals who may have rationally
viewed themselves as victims were not considered as such. In the Stepanian
line, individuals who may have had no knowledge of the crime were
considered victims.
In such a chaotic environment, the Guidelines
amendment holds considerable appeal.
Nevertheless, the amendment represents the triumph of efficiency over
accuracy in sentencing. The Sentencing Commission‘s solution is overbroad
and does not accurately reflect the harm inflicted during the crime. By simply
including every single person whose means were used, the Commission
equates the harm caused to a ―victim‖ who was unaware of the theft with that
of a ―victim‖ who spent months trying to clear his name with a credit agency.
While the new definition has the advantage of being easy to calculate, it is far
too blunt an instrument for a procedure as important as sentencing.
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